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Abstract
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models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party sys-
tems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority
party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions amongmultiple parties whose
programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and
sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate
such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the
election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism
in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary
versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving
inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.
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1. Introduction
Political scientists have long analyzed the trade-offs in-
volved in the design of democratic institutions and asked
which design, if any, is best. Some have focused on elec-
toral systems (e.g., Carey & Hix, 2011; Shugart, 2001),
others on executive formats (e.g., Cheibub, 2007; Linz,
1990) and still others on broader models or visions
of democracy (e.g., Lijphart, 2012; Powell, 2000). The
goal of the present article is to survey and advance
this literature from a particular theoretical perspective.
I re-conceptualize the core difference between different
models of democracy in order to highlight the crucial im-
portance of whether or not there is a separation of pow-
ers between the executive and the legislature.
Much of the existing literature distinguishes between
“majoritarian” democracy, on the one hand, and “con-
sensus” (Lijphart, 2012) or “proportional” democracy
(Powell, 2000) on the other. In contrast, I propose a
distinction between simple and complex majoritarian-
ism (Ganghof, 2015). What it shares with the more es-
tablished ones is its focus on differences in electoral
and party systems: Simple majoritarianism tries to re-
duce the number of parties and politicized conflict di-
mensions; complex majoritarianism embraces multiple
parties, the easy entrance of new parties and a multi-
dimensional structure of partisan conflict. Where my
conceptualization differs, however, is that it also con-
trasts different styles of coalition-formation. Complex
majoritarianism is not about reaching consensus or the
proportional influence of all parliamentary parties, but
about the possibility of governing with shifting, issue-
specific coalitions. Powell (2000, p. 256, note 259) noted
this possibility in his seminal study, but did not investi-
gate it systematically.
If we do so, the difference between executive for-
mats becomes much more salient. The reason is that
a pattern of issue-specific coalition-making in the leg-
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islature is rather difficult to create and sustain under
pure parliamentary government. Since the cabinet can
be voted out of office at any time and for purely polit-
ical reasons by some parliamentary majority, there is a
greater imperative to build fixed, multi-party coalitions
in which each party agrees to support the cabinet in re-
turn for veto power over all or most pieces of legislation
(Tsebelis, 2002). In contrast, a separation of powers be-
tween executive and the legislature can facilitate the for-
mation of issue-specific legislative coalitions.
The article also compares different variants of the
separation of powers. While the political science litera-
ture tends to associate this separation closely with the
notion of presidential government, I emphasize that this
association is historical rather than logical. Because the
invention of presidential government was strongly influ-
enced by monarchical ideas, the justification of the sep-
aration of powers became closely linked to the justifi-
cation of concentrating executive power in a single hu-
man being. However, alternatives to presidential govern-
ment exist, most notably “semi-parliamentary govern-
ment” (Ganghof, 2018), which can achieve the benefits
of the separation of powers without the dangers of per-
sonalizing power in the executive. These benefits include
the potential to achieve a particular balance between the
goals of simple and complex majoritarianism.
Section 2 elaborates on the distinction between sim-
ple and complexmajoritarianism. On this basis, Section 3
discusses prominent strategies for optimizing the design
of parliamentary systems of government. It shows how
these strategies are able to reconcile some elements
of simple and complex majoritarianism but not others.
Sections 4 and 5 discuss how the presidential and “semi-
parliamentary” variants of the separation of powers can
achieve a different form of reconciliation between the
two models of democracy. Section 6 discusses deadlock,
one of themain dangers of the separation of powers, and
suggests that it might be easier to avoid under the semi-
parliamentary variant. Section 7 is a brief conclusion.
2. Simple versus Complex Majoritarianism
The distinction between simple and complex majoritari-
anism builds on the seminal works of Powell (2000) and
Lijphart (2012) but departs from them in important ways.
I have discussed the differences in some detail elsewhere
(Ganghof, 2015; Ganghof & Eppner, 2019). Here I try to
summarize the distinction succinctly.
Simple majoritarianism is similar to what Powell and
Lijphart call “majoritarian democracy.” The core ideal
is to limit the number of parliamentary parties to only
two, so that one party gains a legislative majority. I fo-
cus on three goals associated with this model of demo-
cratic majority formation. First, voters ought to be able
to choose more or less directly between two alterna-
tives for government. This is often called “identifiability”.
Second, one-party majority cabinets are generally seen
to achievemaximal “clarity of responsibility.” Third, a low
number of parties in parliament and cabinet is conducive
to “cabinet stability.” As the name suggests, simple ma-
joritarianism tries to simplify as much as possible—at
least in the eyes of the voters—theprocess of democratic
majority formation.
Complex majoritarianism, in contrast, embraces the
complexity that results fromhavingmultiple parties com-
peting on multiple, partly cross-cutting, political issues.
Again, we can highlight three goals in particular. The first
is the “mechanical proportionality” of the electoral sys-
tem. This goal is often seen as an expression of citizens’
democratic equality and it requires that x percent of the
votes of any party—real and hypothetical—is translated
into x percent of seats (McGann, 2013). Mechanical pro-
portionality also makes it easier for new parties to enter
the competition. The second related goal is an “uncon-
strained multidimensionality” of partisan preferences. If
some parties take “left” positions on some issues and
“right” positions on others, more voters are likely to find
a party they feel represented by. There is also some evi-
dence to suggest that unconstrainedmultidimensionality
is beneficial for how citizens actually perceive the qual-
ity of democracy (Reinermann & Barbet, 2019; Rosset &
Stecker, 2019; Stecker & Tausendpfund, 2016).
The third goal of complex majoritarianism is that
coalition-building on legislation is issue-specific, so that
different majorities can form on different pieces of leg-
islation. It is with respect to this goal that the concept
of complex majoritarianism differs most strongly from
Lijphart’s (2012) consensus democracy or Powell’s (2000)
proportional democracy. There is nothing inherently con-
sensual about issue-specific decision-making, as the ma-
jority on each issue might be minimal-winning (i.e., it
includes only as many parties as are needed for a ma-
jority). Similarly, issue-specific decision-making does not
imply the proportional influence of all parties but might
rather give disproportionate influence to the median
party on the respective issues. Authors like Ward and
Weale (2010; see also Weale, 2019) prefer issue-specific
coalition-building for precisely this reason. Nevertheless,
it is important to point out that in his seminal study,
Powell was well aware of the potential attractiveness of
issue-specific coalition-building and saw it as one variant
of his proportional democracy. He wrote:
A third argument in favor of proportionalism is that
policymakers should choose the policy desired by the
citizen majority on each issue. Because many issues
will be considered by the national government be-
tween every election and different sets of citizens will
form the majority on different issues, it is important
that the policy-making coalition not be locked into
place by the immediate election outcome….Although
this is potentially an important argument for propor-
tional approaches, it is not one that I am able to
see how to explore empirically with available data.
(Powell, 2000, p. 256, note 259)
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Table 1. Two polar models of democratic majority formation.
Simple Majoritarianism Complex Majoritarianism
Identifiability Mechanical Proportionality
Clarity of Responsibility Unconstrained Multidimensionality of Representation
Cabinet Stability Issue-Specific Coalition-Building
Source: Author’s.
In sum, we can characterize each of the two polar mod-
els of democratic majority formation in terms of three
goals, as summarized in Table 1. The respective goals are
at odds with one another, as those of simple majoritar-
ianism are facilitated by having few parliamentary par-
ties, whereas those of complex majoritarianism tend to
encourage or require the existence of many parties. In
the next section, I will discuss how the resulting trade-
offs play out in a pure parliamentary system and to what
degree influential optimization strategies can achieve a
sort of compromise between the two models.
3. Trade-Offs and Their Optimization in Parliamentary
Systems
Efforts to balance the goals of simple and complex ma-
joritarianism are severely constrained by a parliamentary
system of government, in two main ways. First, this sys-
tem implies a single chain of delegation from voters to
the cabinet: Voters elect a parliament, which selects a
cabinet (e.g., Strøm, 2003). Due to this chain, the com-
peting demands that the ideals of simple and complex
majoritarianism put on the party system must thus be
balanced in the design of the electoral system for the leg-
islature. Second, by definition, a parliamentary system
implies that the cabinet can at any time be dismissed by
some parliamentary majority for purely political reasons
in a no-confidence vote. As a result, the precise rules of
cabinet selection and removals must balance the com-
peting goals of cabinet stability and issue-specific major-
ity formation. I discuss both constraints in turn.
3.1. Optimizing the Electoral System
There are two prominent ideas about how to optimize
the design of the electoral system, which are particularly
relevant for parliamentary systems of government. Both
of them try to reconcile at least one of the two first goals
of simple majoritarianism—identifiability and clarity of
responsibility—with some degree of proportional repre-
sentation. The first idea focuses on pre-electoral coali-
tions. If we can design the electoral system to be propor-
tional but also to induce multiple parties to group into
two competing blocs, we might be able to reconcile pro-
portionality with identifiability (Shugart, 2001). Voters
can vote for a party and, simultaneously, for one of two
competing coalitions. Hence, they can be fairly repre-
sented and directly select the government, rather than
leaving this to politicians in post-electoral coalition nego-
tiations. Germany’s mixed-member proportional system
was regarded as an example for this kind of optimization,
at least for some time. In the 1980s and 1990s German
elections were often characterized by a competition be-
tween two pre-electoral coalitions: Christian Democrats
and Liberals versus Social Democrats and Greens.
While this is a plausible path towards optimization,
it can reconcile the goals of complex majoritarianism
only to a rather limited extent. One reason is that two
competing blocs are more likely to emerge when par-
ties compete along one dominant conflict dimension
(Ganghof, Eppner, & Heeß, 2015). Since electoral sys-
tems with a high mechanical proportionality facilitate
multiple dimensions of competition, it is probably not
enough that the electoral system encourages the forma-
tion of competing pre-electoral blocs—it must also re-
duce the mechanical proportionality of the electoral sys-
tem and constrain dimensionality. Hence these two ba-
sic goals of complex majoritarianism must be substan-
tially compromised.
The second prominent optimization approach explic-
itly embraces the need for reducing mechanical propor-
tionality. It assumes that what we should really care
about is “behavioral” proportionality, that is, how pro-
portionally actual votes are translated into seats (cf. Best
& Zhirnov, 2015): If some degree of mechanical dispro-
portionality keeps some voters from voting for small par-
ties, and some would-be parties or candidates to en-
ter the competition, this is as it should be. Carey and
Hix (2011) take this view and note that the trade-off be-
tween behavioral proportionality and the number of par-
ties in parliament and government is non-linear. That is,
electoral systems with a moderate degree of mechanical
disproportionality might substantially reduce the num-
ber of parties in parliament and government, thereby
substantially boosting clarity of responsibility, but with-
out increasing behavioral disproportionality very much.
These systems might be optimal in that there is much to
gain at low costs; there is a sort of sweet spot of mechan-
ical disproportionality. Spain is an example of a country
that seemed to hit Carey and Hix’s (2011) sweet spot.
Of course, the plausibility of this argument depends
not only on how we feel about the importance of me-
chanical vis-à-vis behavioral proportionality, but also on
how much non-linearity there actually is in the relation-
ship between behavioral proportionality and party frag-
mentation. A number of authors worry that the poten-
tial for optimization might not be that great after all, and
that our efforts at finding the sweet spot might also lead
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us to theworst of both worlds: substantial disproportion-
ality and many parties (McGann, 2013; Raabe & Linhart,
2018; St-Vincent, Blais, & Pilet, 2016). In any case, the
second optimization approach also accepts significant in-
stitutional constrains on the two basic goals of complex
majoritarianism: mechanical proportionality and the di-
mensionality of party preferences.
3.2. Optimizing Executive–Legislative Relations
Let us now turn to the design of the precise rules for
cabinet selection and removal. These matter for the
trade-off between cabinet stability, on the one hand,
and issue-specific majority formation in the legislature
on the other. From the perspective of complex majori-
tarianism, single-party minority cabinets that seek issue-
specific support seem attractive (Ward & Weale, 2010;
Weale, 2019). They could be quite powerful (Tsebelis,
2002, pp. 97–99) but would also have to be attentive to
the preferences of potential support parties. In contrast,
when parties enter fixed coalitions, either portfolio coali-
tions or support agreements, they tend to establish each
other as “veto players,” so that legislation requires una-
nimity within the coalition (Tsebelis, 2002). Empirical ev-
idence suggests that when minority cabinets form, it is
more likely that opposition parties can represent their
voters not only in parliamentary debate but also in ac-
tual policy-making (e.g., Angelova, Bäck,Müller, & Strobl,
2018; Ganghof, Eppner, Stecker, Heeß, & Schukraft, 2019;
Klüver & Zubek, 2018). The problem is that institutional
efforts to stabilize cabinets in fragmented parliaments
may discourage the formation of minority cabinets, es-
pecially single-party minority cabinets that seek issue-
specific support.
One way to stabilize cabinets in fragmented parlia-
ments is to make it institutionally more difficult for a
parliamentary majority to dismiss the cabinet. The most
drastic way to do so is to require the no-confidence vote
to be “constructive.” This means that an (absolute) par-
liamentary majority can only dismiss the prime minister
if it simultaneously elects a new one. The constructive
no-confidence vote can be used to balance permissive
electoral rules with highly restrictive rules of cabinet re-
moval (Lijphart, 2012, p. 298). It was first implemented
in Germany’s Basic Law of 1949 and later also adopted,
e.g., by Spain, Belgium and Israel. A constructive vote of
no-confidence is likely to work against the formation of
(single-party)minority cabinetswithout stable support in
parliament, for several reasons.
One reason is institutional consistency. Since the con-
structive vote of no-confidence implies an investiture
vote, consistency seems to require an investiture vote
also after an election. Sieberer (2015) has shown that
cabinet selection and removal rules are correlated in this
way. Yet when the cabinet has to be voted into office by
a majority in parliament, or at least when this majority
must be absolute, the formation of minority cabinets be-
comes more difficult (Bergman, 1993; Cheibub, Martin,
& Rasch, 2019). When simple majorities are ultimately
sufficient in an investiture vote, the formation of (single-
party) minority cabinets becomes relatively easier, Spain
being a case in point (Field, 2016).
However, more recent developments in Spain might
also exemplify a second, more strategic reason why a
constructive no-confidence vote works against the for-
mation of (single-party) minority cabinets. Since the con-
structive no-confidence vote stabilizes aminority cabinet
after it takes office, opposition parties might be less will-
ing to let it take office. These parties may thus be dis-
couraged from supporting a single party in an investi-
ture vote (by abstaining or voting for it). This logic would
help to explain the severe problem of cabinet formation
after the Spanish elections in April 2019 (Field, 2019).
The conditions for a single-party minority cabinet were
in many ways very favorable: The Socialist Party was the
largest party by some margin (holding 35.1 percent of
the seats), it was the central (median) party on the dom-
inant axes of political conflict, and it could have prof-
ited from the Spanish governments’ strong institutional
powers to set the agenda as well as the constructive no-
confidence vote. Anticipating this institutional strength,
however, the left-wing Unidas Podemos demanded inclu-
sion into the government and was unwilling to support
a Socialist minority cabinet in the investiture procedure.
As a result, Spain is headed for yet another general elec-
tion in November 2019.
Finally, there is the problem of legitimizing the gov-
ernment. We can imagine an institutional configuration
inwhich the constructive no-confidence vote is combined
with the absence of any investiture vote after an elec-
tion. The problem with this combination is that it would
greatly reduce the power of parliament over the cabinet
(cf. Sieberer, 2015) and thus its ability to democratically
authorize a cabinet. It might simply remain unclear which
parliamentary party has the right to form a government.
The underlying reason for this legitimacy problem is that
parliamentary elections only register voters’ first prefer-
ences. As a result, the plurality party—the party with the
most votes or seats—is not necessarily the party that has
the greatest voter support overall. It is not necessarily the
party that has a legitimate claim to form a single-partymi-
nority cabinet. The formation of a fixedmajority coalition
is oneway to create legitimacy on the basis of voters’ first
preferences. It is the coalition parties’ ability to form a
majority that creates a legitimate claim to govern. Hence,
if we wanted to clearly legitimize a single cabinet party
without a majority, we would have to allow voters to ex-
press more than their first preference. Yet this is difficult
to do in a parliamentary system of government.
3.3. An Empirical Visualization
The arguments presented above imply that, within a par-
liamentary system of government, it is impossible to
get the “best of both worlds.” While some goals of sim-
ple majoritarianism can be reconciled, to a certain de-
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gree, with some goals of complex majoritarianism, the
underlying tension between the two models of demo-
cratic majority formation remains. Ganghof, Eppner, and
Pörschke (2018) visualize this fact in a descriptive data
analysis for the period from 1995–2015, which is par-
tially reproduced in Figure 1. The two dimensions in
the figure measure simple and complex majoritarianism
respectively. Each dimension averages normalized mea-
sures of the three goals associated with each model
(see Table 1). Normalization implies that one unit cor-
responds to one standard deviation, while the average
value is zero. The detailed variable definitions are pro-
vided in the Appendix.
Figure 1 reveals a linear trade-off between the
broader bundles of goals. All countries are fairly close to
the estimated regression line. At one end of this line is
the United Kingdom, which approximates the ideal type
of simple majoritarianism. At the other end is Denmark,
which exemplifies many elements of complex majoritari-
anism. Cases with “optimized” electoral systems such as
Germany or Spain have less extreme positions and are
above the trade-off line, but they cannot escape the un-
derlying goal conflicts. In both countries the formation
and stabilization of cabinets has also become more diffi-
cult after the period considered here. All in all, Figure 1
suggest that parliamentary systems can be designed to
take intermediate positions on the trade-off line, but
they can hardly transcend the overall trade-off structure.
Can separation of power-systems do better?
4. Presidentialism as Optimization
The best-known version of the separation of powers is
presidential government. It requires that the chief exec-
utive (the president) is elected independently from the
legislature—usually in direct elections—and that he or
she serves a fixed term. A legislative majority cannot re-
move the president in a political no-confidence proce-
dure, but only in an impeachment procedure.
Since the elections of the executive (president)
and legislature are institutionally separated, efforts at
optimization can focus on designing them differently
(Cheibub, 2006, 2007; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997;
Shugart & Carey, 1992). In particular, the legislature can
be elected proportionally and without constraining the
dimensionality of party competition. Legislative coali-
tions can form in an issue-specific manner, as the legisla-
ture is liberated from the need to maintain the executive
in office. At the same time, presidential elections allow
voters to make a clear choice between alternative gov-
ernments (thus achieving identifiability) and the elected
government is stabilized by the president’s fixed terms.
Moreover, if presidential elections use absolute majority
rule (two-round systems), voters have a chance to make
more than their first preferences count. If their preferred
candidate in the first round does qualify for the runoff
election, they still have a vote. The elected president can
thus be clearly legitimized by an electoral majority, even
if his or her party is far away from amajority in legislative
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elections. In short, the separation of powers may help
to mitigate some of the relevant trade-offs. In particu-
lar, it can reconcile identifiable and stable governments
with issue-specific decision-making in a multi-party and
multi-dimensional legislature. In terms of Figure 1, awell-
designed presidential system could probably achieve a
position in the upper right quadrant.
The separation of powers cannot optimize all trade-
offs, though. The clarity of responsibility for policies is
likely to be compromised when the president’s party
does not have a majority in the proportionally elected
assembly. After all, a minority president needs to find
legislative support and thus make concessions. Clarity
of responsibility might be higher if the president has
strong institutional powers—agenda, veto and decree
powers—so that he or she does not need to make large
concessions (Cheibub, 2006). In this case, though, the
proportional representation of parties in the legislature
and the possibility of issue-specific legislative coalitions
become less consequential for the substance of deci-
sions. The tension between fair representation and clear
responsibility does not disappear under the separation
of powers.
Yet presidential government also opens up new
trade-offs. It achieves the separation of powers by con-
centrating much executive power in a single human
being. This is to some extent a historical overhang
from monarchy (Colomer, 2013; DiClerico, 1987, p. 304;
Nelson, 2014; Scheuerman, 2005) and it tends toweaken
the programmatic capacities and voting discipline of po-
litical parties (Carey, 2007; Samuels & Shugart, 2010).
Furthermore, when presidential constitutions try to limit
the power of the president it often leads to further trade-
offs. For example, term limits for presidents eliminate
(personal) electoral accountability in the presidents’ last
term and make it impossible to re-elect well-performing
incumbents. To reduce the institutional dominance of a
fixed-term president, presidential constitutions typically
disallow the dissolution of the assembly, thereby remov-
ing a way to resolve a deadlock between the executive
and the legislature. A number of studies suggest that
presidential systems increase the risk that democratically
elected governments subvert democracy once they are
in office (Maeda, 2010; Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, & Vairo,
2019; Svolik, 2015).
All of this raises the question whether the opti-
mization potential of presidential systems could not
also be achieved differently. Some might see semi-
presidentialism as desirable, but this hybrid between par-
liamentarism and presidentialism might just as well lead
to the worst of both worlds. After all, a semi-presidential
system is most commonly defined by having a directly
elected president and a prime minister who can be dis-
missed in a no-confidence vote of the assembly (Elgie,
2011). Hence to the extent that the president is powerful,
these systems also suffer from the problems associated
with the institutionalized personalization of the execu-
tive (Åberg & Sedelius, 2018; Samuels & Shugart, 2010).
And since the parliament is not liberated from keeping
the prime minister and his or her cabinet in office, issue-
specific majority formation is just as difficult as under
pure parliamentarism.
5. Semi-Parliamentarism as Optimization
Is there another form of the separation of powers
that has the same optimization potential as presiden-
tial government, but avoids institutionalized personal-
ism in the executive? Ganghof (2018) argues that “semi-
parliamentary” government is a candidate. Its trick, as it
were, is to move the locus of the separation of powers
into the legislature. Semi-parliamentary systems divide
the legislature into two parts, both of which are directly
elected but only one of which can dismiss the primemin-
ister in a no-confidence vote. They thus separate power
between one part of the legislature that is fusedwith the
executive and another part that is not.
Existing semi-parliamentary systems are essentially a
special formof bicameralism. They include theAustralian
Commonwealth and Japan as well as the Australian
states of New South Wales (NSW), South Australia,
Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia (Smith, 2018;
Taflaga, 2018). These systems are special because upper
houses in otherwise parliamentary systems are typically
either not directly elected (like the German Bundesrat)
or, if they are, they also possess the right to a no-
confidence vote (like the Italian Senate).
Ganghof (2018) argues that semi-parliamentary sys-
tems have the same optimization potential as presiden-
tial systems because the electoral systems of the two
parts of the legislature can also be designed differently.
The first, “confidence,” chamber can construct two-party
systems and one-party majority cabinets, whereas the
second, “legislative,” chamber can allow for multidimen-
sional, multiparty competition. Hence voters can clearly
authorize a party and its prospective prime minister to
form the government,which is stabilized by a clearmajor-
ity in the first chamber. Executive power is not as person-
alized as in a presidential system, because the primemin-
ister can be replaced at any time by the majority party
or the first chamber majority. However, this party can-
not govern alone but has to seek issue-specific major-
ity support in the more proportionally elected second
chamber. Ganghof et al. (2018) show that well-designed
semi-parliamentary systems can achieve a position in
the upper right quadrant of Figure 1. That is, they can
achieve identifiable and stable one-party cabinets, gov-
erning with issue-specific multi-party coalitions in a mul-
tidimensional space.
Consider the Australian state of Victoria as an exam-
ple. After the 2018 election of both chambers, the Labor
party governs with a large majority in the first chamber
(62.5 percent of all seats). In the second chamber, how-
ever, the government is in a minority position (45 per-
cent). The balance of power is held by eight (!) minor par-
ties, only one of which (the Greens) also gained seats in
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the first chamber (Victorian Electoral Commission, n.d.).
Victorian governments seek issue-specific support in the
second chamber, which allows all opposition parties to
become members of legislative coalitions. Yet since the
government can choose between different coalitions, it
does not necessarily have to make many large conces-
sions (cf. Tsebelis, 2002).
While all existing semi-parliamentary systems are
bicameral, Ganghof (2016, 2018) suggests that this is
no necessity. The confidence chamber could also be
turned into a two-party confidence committee embed-
ded in a proportionally elected parliament. Consider,
e.g., a mixed-member proportional electoral system as
it is used in Germany and New Zealand, in which part
of parliament is elected in single-member districts, but
the overall composition of parliament is proportional.
A semi-parliamentary system could be created by re-
stricting the right to participate in the no-confidence pro-
cedure to the members elected in single-member dis-
tricts. Smaller parties would thus be fairly represented
in the legislative process but denied power over the
government—just as in Victoria and other bicameral
forms of semi-parliamentarism.
A question to ask about semi-parliamentarism, and
presidentialism for that matter, is whether the optimiza-
tion achieved by having two elected agents of voters
may not lead to new trade-offs elsewhere in the system.
Most notably, the question is whether the separation of
powers does not lead to a massive problem of legisla-
tive deadlock.
6. The Problem of Deadlock
The problem of deadlock has played a central role in the
political science debate about presidentialism following
the famous work of Juan Linz (1990). This literature has
shown, however, that the problem can easily be exag-
gerated (Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2018; Cheibub,
Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004). In this section, I discuss
some potential institutional remedies for the problem of
deadlock. I also suggest that this problem ismore difficult
to solve in presidential systems because some remedies
might reinforce the concentration of power in a single
human being.
First, assembly dissolution and early elections can re-
solve deadlock (Bulmer, 2017). Presidential government
is often associated with the impossibility of assembly dis-
solution, but there are presidential constitutions that al-
low dissolution under certain circumstances (Cheibub,
Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2014). As noted above, however, if
the president is given the power to dissolve the legisla-
ture, this may strengthen the personalist concentration
of power in the executive. Dissolution power has been
identified as an important component of authoritarian
forms of presidential supremacy (Stykow, 2019).
The possibility of assembly dissolution might be
more compatible with the semi-parliamentary variant of
the separation of powers, especially when it requires
a double dissolution of both houses. More than half
of the existing semi-parliamentary constitutions allow
for a double dissolution of (parts of) both houses un-
der certain circumstances (Australian Commonwealth,
NSW, South Australia and Victoria). In Victoria, for ex-
ample, the terms of the second chamber are tied to
the first chamber. Hence whenever the first chamber
is dissolved—either because of a “deadlocked bill” or
after a successful no-confidence vote—the entire sec-
ond chamber is dissolved too (Taylor, 2006, Articles 6A
and 65E(2) in combination with Article 28(2) of the
Constitution of Victoria). This dissolution-option for re-
solving deadlock does not give up on the separation of
powers entirely, because the government or the first
chamber majority can never dissolve the second cham-
ber without standing for re-election themselves.
Second, a possible way to reduce the likelihood of
deadlock is to deny one of the two “branches” absolute
veto power. Some presidential systems allow the assem-
bly to override the president’s veto with a simple or ab-
solute majority, rather than a supermajority (Colomer &
Negretto, 2005, p. 85). In bicameral systems, the com-
mon approach is to weaken the veto power of the sec-
ond chamber. In a semi-parliamentary system, however,
it might also be plausible—in analogy to presidents with
weak veto powers in presidential systems—to weaken
the veto power of the first chamber. If we see the first
chamber mainly as a way for voters to directly choose a
non-personalized (single-party)minority cabinet, itmight
not necessarily require absolute legislative veto power.
After all, minority cabinets in parliamentary systems have
no legislative veto power either. To be able to govern,
however, the government and/or its majority in the first
chamber would probably need strong agenda-setting
powers vis-à-vis the second chamber, such as the double
dissolution threat or institutional privileges in the initia-
tion and amendment of (certain types of) legislation.
Third, another way to resolve deadlock in a separa-
tion of powers-system could be to let the voters decide.
Early elections do this as well, but rather bluntly. A com-
plementary and issue-specific resolution mechanism is a
popular referendum on a deadlocked bill. In NSW, a pop-
ular referendum, initiated by the first chamber, is the
only way to resolve bicameral deadlock on a particular
bill (Art. 5B of the Constitution of NSW). While the rules
in NSW privilege the first chamber as the agenda setter,
it might be desirable to allow both chambers to initiate a
referendum on a deadlocked proposal. This would tend
to give greater bargaining strength to whichever cham-
ber’s position is deemed closer to the preferences of the
voters. Moreover, given the inherent uncertainty of a ref-
erendum, both chambers would probably have strong in-
centives to compromise and thus avoid the referendum.
7. Conclusion
The constitutional separation of powers between the
executive and the legislature is often understood as
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a way to limit and diffuse power or as a particular
approach to controlling voters’ representative “agents”
(e.g., Strøm, 2003). Here I have adopted a somewhat
different, complementary, perspective. This separation
can also be understood as an effort to balance com-
peting goals in the constitutional design of democracy.
My point has not been that the resulting balance is
better, all things considered, than that achievable un-
der parliamentary government. It might be, but I don’t
think we have enough evidence to support such a claim.
My point is rather that the separation of powers al-
lows for a type of balance that is unavailable under
pure parliamentarism. In particular, parliamentary gov-
ernment makes it extremely difficult to reconcile the
goals of identifiability and cabinet stability with the goal
of issue-specific decision-making in a multidimensional
space. Presidential and semi-parliamentary government
can reconcile these goals to some extent because the
executive can be designed to emerge and survive in-
dependently from a multi-party legislature. It is either
elected by the people (presidentialism) or emerges from
a separated part of the legislature, in which the ef-
fective number of parties is low (Australian-style semi-
parliamentarism).
What I did suggest, at least tentatively, is that the
semi-parliamentary version of the separation of powers
is superior to the presidential version. While more the-
oretical and empirical analysis is needed to substantiate
this suggestion, it might serve as a reminder that demo-
cratic constitutions resulted from a path-dependent pro-
cess that was strongly influenced by the self-interest of
powerful actors, as well as by their limited foresight (e.g.,
about the emergence of political parties). Hence there is
no reason to assume that the constitutional designs that
dominate the democratic world today, such as presiden-
tial government, could not be improved upon. The fre-
quent tendency to equate the notion of the separation
of powers with presidential government might to some
extent be justified historically, but it is not justified log-
ically. The search for more optimal democratic constitu-
tions should certainly continue.
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Appendix
1. Measurement of Simple and Complex Majoritarianism (see Figure 1)
1.1. Simple Majoritarianism
1.1.1. Identifiability
Average of Blocvote and Linkage
Blocvote = Share of votes of the two biggest blocs (a bloc being a party or a pre-electoral coalition of parties)
Linkage = Average of Pecgov and a majority status (dummy)
Pecgov = Dummy that is 1 for each cabinet that consists of a bloc
1.1.2. Clarity of Responsibility
Duration-weighted average of cabinet types, based on the following ranking:
1 = Single-party with majority in all directly elected houses
.85 = Single-party with majority in lower house only
.66 =Multi-party with majority in all directly elected houses
.50 =Multi-party with majority in lower house only
.33 = Single-party minority
0 =Multi-party minority
1.1.3. Cabinet Stability
Average duration of cabinets. The average duration of cabinets is calculated for each legislative term and divided by the
constitutionally maximal term length. Those durations are then averaged (weighted by the term length). A new cabinet
begins when elections take place or the party composition of the cabinet changes.
1.2. Complex Majoritarianism
1.2.1. Mechanical Proportionality
Log of effective district magnitude (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989)
M= (50/T), withM being the effective district magnitude and T the legal threshold. In countries with directly elected upper
houses, values are for the house with the greater proportionality.
1.2.2. Unconstrained Multidimensionality of Representation
Effective number of dimensions (END) based on the results of principal component analyses that use party positions on
several items as variables and parties as cases. Cases are weighted with seat shares.
END = 1∑ P2i
,
with i components and p being a component’s share of explained variance (the relative size of the Eigenvalue). In countries
with directly elected upper houses, values are for the house with higher dimensionality.
1.2.3. Issue-Specificity in Legislative Coalition-Building
Duration-weighted average of cabinet types, based on the following ranking:
0 =Majority cabinet
.5 = Formal minority cabinet
1 = Substantial minority cabinet
In countries with directly elected upper houses, the values are for the house with the greater potential for issue-specific
coalition-building.
Reference:
Taagepera, R., & Shugart, M. S. (1989). Seats and votes: The effects and determinants of electoral systems. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
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